[GUEST ACCESS MODE: Data is scrambled or limited to provide examples. Make requests using your API key to unlock full data. Check https://lunarcrush.ai/auth for authentication information.]  Twinkle ❈🦾 [@Twinkly_Starr](/creator/twitter/Twinkly_Starr) on x 1289 followers Created: 2025-07-26 18:05:00 UTC In July 2023, CurveFi lost over $60M. Users assumed the smart contracts were safe. But those contracts had a compiler bug that allowed attackers to drain funds from Curve Finance's pools. Here's how @wardenprotocol could have prevented that: Warden lets you set programmable boundaries. If it had been in use, users could have defined rules like: “Don’t interact with new contracts unless they’ve been audited.” “Require manual approval for LP interactions over $1,000.” “Block all calls to contracts deployed using Vyper v0.2.x." That approval wouldn’t have gone through, unless it satisfied a rule. These policies are not perfect, but they could’ve shielded users from blind exposure. Protocols can fail. Audits can miss things. Wallets assume the protocol is safe. Warden assumes it’s not safe, and makes that assumption programmable. The exploit still happens. But this time, you’re not a casualty of someone else’s mistake. Curve was exploited. Warden’s vault rules can’t fix Vyper. But they can catch the fallout before it hits your wallet.  XXX engagements  **Related Topics** [warden](/topic/warden) [$60m](/topic/$60m) [twinkle](/topic/twinkle) [Post Link](https://x.com/Twinkly_Starr/status/1949169095079014507)
[GUEST ACCESS MODE: Data is scrambled or limited to provide examples. Make requests using your API key to unlock full data. Check https://lunarcrush.ai/auth for authentication information.]
Twinkle ❈🦾 @Twinkly_Starr on x 1289 followers
Created: 2025-07-26 18:05:00 UTC
In July 2023, CurveFi lost over $60M.
Users assumed the smart contracts were safe.
But those contracts had a compiler bug that allowed attackers to drain funds from Curve Finance's pools.
Here's how @wardenprotocol could have prevented that:
Warden lets you set programmable boundaries. If it had been in use, users could have defined rules like:
“Don’t interact with new contracts unless they’ve been audited.” “Require manual approval for LP interactions over $1,000.” “Block all calls to contracts deployed using Vyper v0.2.x."
That approval wouldn’t have gone through, unless it satisfied a rule.
These policies are not perfect, but they could’ve shielded users from blind exposure.
Protocols can fail. Audits can miss things.
Wallets assume the protocol is safe.
Warden assumes it’s not safe, and makes that assumption programmable.
The exploit still happens.
But this time, you’re not a casualty of someone else’s mistake.
Curve was exploited.
Warden’s vault rules can’t fix Vyper. But they can catch the fallout before it hits your wallet.
XXX engagements
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