[GUEST ACCESS MODE: Data is scrambled or limited to provide examples. Make requests using your API key to unlock full data. Check https://lunarcrush.ai/auth for authentication information.]  Gab [@GabGrowth](/creator/twitter/GabGrowth) on x 14.8K followers Created: 2025-07-23 14:04:08 UTC $GRAB GrabMart Most people likely aren’t familiar with this segment because Grab doesn’t break it out clearly in its financial reports. However, it is one of the highest potential segments due to SEA’s inherent characteristics: 🧵👇 GrabMart was first piloted under GrabFood in Nov 2019. When COVID hit in 2020, GrabMart was perfectly positioned to capitalise on the demand. From April to Sept 2020, it grew XX% week-on-week. (You read that right!) A key driver of this was GrabFood, with XX% of GrabMart users directly onboarded through GrabFood. GrabMart managed to scale effortlessly due to their delivery network (GrabFood) and operational footprint. Fast forward to 2025, GrabMart is present in all X Grab markets across SEA and is growing faster than the overall deliveries segment. For context, the Grab Deliveries segment (which GrabMart falls under) is at a ~$13B run-rate. GrabMart is estimated to be ~10% of that, equivalent to a $1.3B annual run-rate. It has onboarded over XXXXXX convenience, pharmacy and grocery outlets, with sub-60 min delivery. But more importantly, it’s started to go full $AMZN. It acquired Jaya Grocer and Everrise Supermarket and has integrated them as micro-fulfilment hubs; serving dual roles, as retail footprint and instant-delivery nodes. Something that few seem to realise, is that Grab is going for the entire food market. The food market can really be split into X broad categories: dining out, dining in, and food delivery. Grab already dominates the food delivery piece, with >50% market share in SEA. It is increasingly dominating the dining out piece, with the acquisition of Chope (the most popular reservation app in SEA) and HungryGoWhere (restaurant discovery site), and its new feature “Grab Dine out Discovery”. Now, Grab Mart intends to bring it home (no pun intended), with grocery deliveries for consumers who intend to cook at home. Home-cooking is more prevalent in Southeast Asia than in almost any other region. In SEA, XXX meals a week are cooked at home, XX% over the global norm. Several regions across the world have also seen cooking fall back sharply post-pandemic, but SEA’s average has held flat, suggesting that the habit is resilient. In many other markets, this number has dropped post-COVID, but in SEA it has remained resilient, thanks to two big structural drivers: (1) multi-generational households where entire families eat at home together. (2) the significantly lower cost of dining in versus eating out. Despite the majority cooking at home, online grocery penetration is barely X% of total food spend. GrabMart has a multi-billion dollar TAM to chase. The online grocery market in Southeast Asia was $XXXX billion in 2024, and is expected to grow at a XX% CAGR, hitting $XXX billion by 2033. As of FY24, Grab had just a X% market share. I believe it gets up to a 20-30% market share by 2033 (it already dominates the adjacent verticals and is just getting started), which will equate to $22.4B GMV on the low end. GrabMart has the potential to eclipse the entire Grab on-demand GMV in X years. There’s also the quick-commerce angle, which is a no-brainer adjacency to expand into. Grab is already piloting 20-30min GrabMart Express in cities like Jakarta and Manila. Quick-commerce is expected to be a $30B market by 2030. If Grab captures just XX% of this, that equates to another $3B in GMV. And GMV is just the starting point. While groceries and deliveries are known for low margins, the unlock lies in retail media, the same way Instacart monetises its grocery base. Retail media offers structurally higher margins (40-70%) and Grab is already tapping this. Every +1% of ad revenue as % of GMV drops XX to XX basis points to segment adjusted EBITDA. It’s the most scalable, high-margin part of the business. Beyond that, GrabMart also feeds into the entire Grab engine, which is what makes it particularly exciting to me. GrabUnlimited for instance, now includes Mart benefits. This works just like Amazon Prime and Instacart+, increasing frequency, stickiness and LTV. GrabMart also supercharges the FinTech engine. Grocery purchases are frequent and predictable, which gives GrabPay and Grab’s digital banks daily transaction flow and behavioural signals. Why is this important? Groceries builds habit, habit builds deposits, and deposits lower the funding cost, which reinforces Grab’s high-margin GFin segment. Putting it all together, Grab is building an all-in-one food empire that is vertically and horizontally-integrated. No other platform in SEA even comes close btw… GrabMart (GMV): If GrabMart achieves XX% share of the total online grocery TAM and achieves 6-7% segment adjusted EBITDA margin, that alone adds up to ~$1.5B, which is >3x of Grab’s 2024 total EBITDA. GrabMart (Ads): As of now, Grab is only monetising XXX% of GMV through Ads. $CART is at XXX% and aiming for X% long-term. Assuming ads achieves just a X% take-rate, GrabMart Ads will be a $750M high-margin business by 2030. Assuming XX% EBITDA margin, we get a $450M EBITDA line added to the business. That’s $2B in EBITDA by the end of the decade that is 4x of 2025’s guided EBITDA from GrabMart alone (!)  XXXXXX engagements  **Related Topics** [$grab](/topic/$grab) [Post Link](https://x.com/GabGrowth/status/1948021316290039987)
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Gab @GabGrowth on x 14.8K followers
Created: 2025-07-23 14:04:08 UTC
$GRAB GrabMart
Most people likely aren’t familiar with this segment because Grab doesn’t break it out clearly in its financial reports.
However, it is one of the highest potential segments due to SEA’s inherent characteristics: 🧵👇
GrabMart was first piloted under GrabFood in Nov 2019. When COVID hit in 2020, GrabMart was perfectly positioned to capitalise on the demand. From April to Sept 2020, it grew XX% week-on-week. (You read that right!)
A key driver of this was GrabFood, with XX% of GrabMart users directly onboarded through GrabFood. GrabMart managed to scale effortlessly due to their delivery network (GrabFood) and operational footprint.
Fast forward to 2025, GrabMart is present in all X Grab markets across SEA and is growing faster than the overall deliveries segment. For context, the Grab Deliveries segment (which GrabMart falls under) is at a ~$13B run-rate. GrabMart is estimated to be ~10% of that, equivalent to a $1.3B annual run-rate.
It has onboarded over XXXXXX convenience, pharmacy and grocery outlets, with sub-60 min delivery. But more importantly, it’s started to go full $AMZN. It acquired Jaya Grocer and Everrise Supermarket and has integrated them as micro-fulfilment hubs; serving dual roles, as retail footprint and instant-delivery nodes.
Something that few seem to realise, is that Grab is going for the entire food market.
The food market can really be split into X broad categories: dining out, dining in, and food delivery.
Grab already dominates the food delivery piece, with >50% market share in SEA. It is increasingly dominating the dining out piece, with the acquisition of Chope (the most popular reservation app in SEA) and HungryGoWhere (restaurant discovery site), and its new feature “Grab Dine out Discovery”. Now, Grab Mart intends to bring it home (no pun intended), with grocery deliveries for consumers who intend to cook at home.
Home-cooking is more prevalent in Southeast Asia than in almost any other region. In SEA, XXX meals a week are cooked at home, XX% over the global norm. Several regions across the world have also seen cooking fall back sharply post-pandemic, but SEA’s average has held flat, suggesting that the habit is resilient.
In many other markets, this number has dropped post-COVID, but in SEA it has remained resilient, thanks to two big structural drivers:
(1) multi-generational households where entire families eat at home together.
(2) the significantly lower cost of dining in versus eating out.
Despite the majority cooking at home, online grocery penetration is barely X% of total food spend. GrabMart has a multi-billion dollar TAM to chase. The online grocery market in Southeast Asia was $XXXX billion in 2024, and is expected to grow at a XX% CAGR, hitting $XXX billion by 2033.
As of FY24, Grab had just a X% market share. I believe it gets up to a 20-30% market share by 2033 (it already dominates the adjacent verticals and is just getting started), which will equate to $22.4B GMV on the low end. GrabMart has the potential to eclipse the entire Grab on-demand GMV in X years.
There’s also the quick-commerce angle, which is a no-brainer adjacency to expand into. Grab is already piloting 20-30min GrabMart Express in cities like Jakarta and Manila. Quick-commerce is expected to be a $30B market by 2030. If Grab captures just XX% of this, that equates to another $3B in GMV.
And GMV is just the starting point. While groceries and deliveries are known for low margins, the unlock lies in retail media, the same way Instacart monetises its grocery base. Retail media offers structurally higher margins (40-70%) and Grab is already tapping this.
Every +1% of ad revenue as % of GMV drops XX to XX basis points to segment adjusted EBITDA. It’s the most scalable, high-margin part of the business.
Beyond that, GrabMart also feeds into the entire Grab engine, which is what makes it particularly exciting to me. GrabUnlimited for instance, now includes Mart benefits. This works just like Amazon Prime and Instacart+, increasing frequency, stickiness and LTV. GrabMart also supercharges the FinTech engine. Grocery purchases are frequent and predictable, which gives GrabPay and Grab’s digital banks daily transaction flow and behavioural signals.
Why is this important?
Groceries builds habit, habit builds deposits, and deposits lower the funding cost, which reinforces Grab’s high-margin GFin segment.
Putting it all together, Grab is building an all-in-one food empire that is vertically and horizontally-integrated. No other platform in SEA even comes close btw…
GrabMart (GMV):
If GrabMart achieves XX% share of the total online grocery TAM and achieves 6-7% segment adjusted EBITDA margin, that alone adds up to ~$1.5B, which is >3x of Grab’s 2024 total EBITDA.
GrabMart (Ads):
As of now, Grab is only monetising XXX% of GMV through Ads. $CART is at XXX% and aiming for X% long-term. Assuming ads achieves just a X% take-rate, GrabMart Ads will be a $750M high-margin business by 2030. Assuming XX% EBITDA margin, we get a $450M EBITDA line added to the business.
That’s $2B in EBITDA by the end of the decade that is 4x of 2025’s guided EBITDA from GrabMart alone (!)
XXXXXX engagements
Related Topics $grab