[GUEST ACCESS MODE: Data is scrambled or limited to provide examples. Make requests using your API key to unlock full data. Check https://lunarcrush.ai/auth for authentication information.]  Niels Groeneveld [@nigroeneveld](/creator/twitter/nigroeneveld) on x 12.8K followers Created: 2025-07-20 11:03:00 UTC Inside Department 200: How Iran's MOIS Foreign Intelligence Penetrates Western Activism In the architecture of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence apparatus, Department XXX of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) stands as one of its most opaque and consequential units. Tasked with the coordination of foreign intelligence operations, Department XXX is not simply an espionage wing—it is a long-term strategic tool used by Tehran to identify, monitor, infiltrate, and manipulate foreign civil society, particularly in liberal democracies where protest and dissent can serve as fertile ground for ideological subversion. Among its most impactful priorities in recent years has been the penetration of Western pro-Palestine activism, a project that blends Tehran’s geopolitical objectives with its ideological war against Israel, the U.S., and the liberal order. Established as part of MOIS’s broader restructuring in the 1990s, Department XXX grew out of the need to consolidate foreign intelligence under a professionalized, compartmentalized directorate. While the Quds Force of the IRGC handles kinetic and military support to external proxies, Department XXX operates more subtly—through non-military ideological fronts, diaspora engagement, academic manipulation, and NGO infiltration. Its agents often operate under diplomatic cover in Iranian embassies, cultural missions, and institutions such as Al-Mustafa International University, Iranian Cultural Centers, and Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO). These outlets serve dual purposes: public diplomacy on the surface, and influence operations just beneath. Department 200’s primary objective is to identify and cultivate ideological alignment in Western protest networks—especially those that can be weaponized against Israel or U.S. foreign policy. According to assessments from European counterintelligence agencies and Israeli intelligence briefings shared with Western partners, Department XXX has had long-term operational interest in protest movements that align with anti-Zionism, anti-globalism, anti-imperialism, and radical decolonial frameworks. These themes overlap significantly with the rhetorical ecosystem of many contemporary campus-based pro-Palestinian activist groups, including chapters of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Within Our Lifetime (WOL), and supporters of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. What sets Department XXX apart from traditional intelligence operations is its method of non-attributable ideological engineering. Instead of planting agents to issue directives, the department leverages sympathetic intermediaries and proxy intellectuals—often based in Europe or North America—to insert narratives into activist communities that echo Tehran’s ideological lines. These include the reframing of Zionism as a colonial construct, the moral sanctification of violent “resistance,” and the normalization of Hezbollah and Hamas as legitimate liberation movements. The content, tone, and even visual aesthetics of these narratives often originate from Persian and Arabic language media outlets under Iranian control, later repackaged by Western activists unaware of the original source. To facilitate this process, Department XXX coordinates with friendly academic institutions and conferences, often providing indirect funding to events that center themes such as “Israeli apartheid,” “global resistance movements,” or “intersectional decolonization.” Iranian-connected speakers, often introduced as scholars or human rights advocates, are granted platforms at universities in London, Berlin, Toronto, and Chicago. Their materials are then used by student groups as “educational content,” allowing Department XXX to embed state-approved propaganda within the learning ecosystem of protest culture. One confirmed case, cited by a 2023 Dutch intelligence report, involved a Department XXX asset embedded in a Shiite cultural center in The Hague. The individual coordinated seminars on “Palestinian resistance history,” using materials jointly produced by Hezbollah’s media wing and the ICRO. These materials were later cited in Dutch-language flyers distributed at student-led protests. No direct Iranian attribution was visible. The ideological pipeline was indirect but highly effective. Another pattern observed in multiple countries is Department 200’s use of non-Iranian foreign nationals—especially individuals from Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories—who possess residency in Western countries. These figures, often affiliated with diaspora mosques or social justice NGOs, serve as buffers between MOIS operatives and the target activist communities. Their backgrounds and connections provide cover, while their political alignment with Iran’s regional narrative allows them to act as ideological couriers. In the U.S., intelligence sources point to ongoing Department XXX interest in leveraging groups sympathetic to the Axis of Resistance through legal and academic advocacy. By influencing discourse around anti-terrorism laws, foreign influence registration, and Islamophobia, Department XXX seeks not only to shield its proxies but to shift the legal framework in which they operate. U.S.-based organizations that challenge terrorism designations of groups like Hamas or the PFLP have, at times, echoed legal arguments first developed in Iran-linked think tanks in Beirut and Qom. Department XXX also serves as the liaison to the Iranian Cyber Army, a parallel influence apparatus that supports digital agitation. In the context of protests, the Cyber Army works with Department XXX to amplify narratives, spread disinformation about Israeli actions, and promote hashtags that have gone viral during flare-ups in Gaza or Jerusalem. While the IRGC’s cyber units handle more aggressive cyberattacks, Department XXX focuses on the digital shaping of foreign sentiment—particularly among Arab, Muslim, and left-leaning audiences in the West. The success of Department XXX lies in its strategic subtlety. It does not build or control movements—it nudges them, guides them, and infuses them with ideological fuel that serves Tehran’s foreign policy. It uses the openness of Western civil society—its respect for dissent, multiculturalism, and free speech—as both a shield and a weapon. The absence of overt command makes denial easy and attribution difficult. This deniability has allowed Department XXX to operate freely in dozens of Western cities, even after repeated intelligence warnings. The challenge for Western governments is formidable. Department XXX does not rely on espionage in the conventional sense—it relies on ideological asymmetry, a method that makes detection and disruption far more complex than tracking financial transfers or intercepting arms shipments. Countering its influence will require more than law enforcement; it will demand a recalibration of narrative intelligence, greater scrutiny of foreign-funded ideological infrastructure, and a public willingness to differentiate between authentic protest and engineered radicalization. Iran understands that movements don’t need to be bought to be used. They only need to be redirected. And in that redirection, Department XXX has found one of the most powerful tools of foreign policy Tehran has ever deployed.  XXX engagements  [Post Link](https://x.com/nigroeneveld/status/1946888565499260997)
[GUEST ACCESS MODE: Data is scrambled or limited to provide examples. Make requests using your API key to unlock full data. Check https://lunarcrush.ai/auth for authentication information.]
Niels Groeneveld @nigroeneveld on x 12.8K followers
Created: 2025-07-20 11:03:00 UTC
Inside Department 200: How Iran's MOIS Foreign Intelligence Penetrates Western Activism
In the architecture of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence apparatus, Department XXX of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) stands as one of its most opaque and consequential units. Tasked with the coordination of foreign intelligence operations, Department XXX is not simply an espionage wing—it is a long-term strategic tool used by Tehran to identify, monitor, infiltrate, and manipulate foreign civil society, particularly in liberal democracies where protest and dissent can serve as fertile ground for ideological subversion. Among its most impactful priorities in recent years has been the penetration of Western pro-Palestine activism, a project that blends Tehran’s geopolitical objectives with its ideological war against Israel, the U.S., and the liberal order.
Established as part of MOIS’s broader restructuring in the 1990s, Department XXX grew out of the need to consolidate foreign intelligence under a professionalized, compartmentalized directorate. While the Quds Force of the IRGC handles kinetic and military support to external proxies, Department XXX operates more subtly—through non-military ideological fronts, diaspora engagement, academic manipulation, and NGO infiltration. Its agents often operate under diplomatic cover in Iranian embassies, cultural missions, and institutions such as Al-Mustafa International University, Iranian Cultural Centers, and Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO). These outlets serve dual purposes: public diplomacy on the surface, and influence operations just beneath.
Department 200’s primary objective is to identify and cultivate ideological alignment in Western protest networks—especially those that can be weaponized against Israel or U.S. foreign policy. According to assessments from European counterintelligence agencies and Israeli intelligence briefings shared with Western partners, Department XXX has had long-term operational interest in protest movements that align with anti-Zionism, anti-globalism, anti-imperialism, and radical decolonial frameworks. These themes overlap significantly with the rhetorical ecosystem of many contemporary campus-based pro-Palestinian activist groups, including chapters of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Within Our Lifetime (WOL), and supporters of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement.
What sets Department XXX apart from traditional intelligence operations is its method of non-attributable ideological engineering. Instead of planting agents to issue directives, the department leverages sympathetic intermediaries and proxy intellectuals—often based in Europe or North America—to insert narratives into activist communities that echo Tehran’s ideological lines. These include the reframing of Zionism as a colonial construct, the moral sanctification of violent “resistance,” and the normalization of Hezbollah and Hamas as legitimate liberation movements. The content, tone, and even visual aesthetics of these narratives often originate from Persian and Arabic language media outlets under Iranian control, later repackaged by Western activists unaware of the original source.
To facilitate this process, Department XXX coordinates with friendly academic institutions and conferences, often providing indirect funding to events that center themes such as “Israeli apartheid,” “global resistance movements,” or “intersectional decolonization.” Iranian-connected speakers, often introduced as scholars or human rights advocates, are granted platforms at universities in London, Berlin, Toronto, and Chicago. Their materials are then used by student groups as “educational content,” allowing Department XXX to embed state-approved propaganda within the learning ecosystem of protest culture.
One confirmed case, cited by a 2023 Dutch intelligence report, involved a Department XXX asset embedded in a Shiite cultural center in The Hague. The individual coordinated seminars on “Palestinian resistance history,” using materials jointly produced by Hezbollah’s media wing and the ICRO. These materials were later cited in Dutch-language flyers distributed at student-led protests. No direct Iranian attribution was visible. The ideological pipeline was indirect but highly effective.
Another pattern observed in multiple countries is Department 200’s use of non-Iranian foreign nationals—especially individuals from Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories—who possess residency in Western countries. These figures, often affiliated with diaspora mosques or social justice NGOs, serve as buffers between MOIS operatives and the target activist communities. Their backgrounds and connections provide cover, while their political alignment with Iran’s regional narrative allows them to act as ideological couriers.
In the U.S., intelligence sources point to ongoing Department XXX interest in leveraging groups sympathetic to the Axis of Resistance through legal and academic advocacy. By influencing discourse around anti-terrorism laws, foreign influence registration, and Islamophobia, Department XXX seeks not only to shield its proxies but to shift the legal framework in which they operate. U.S.-based organizations that challenge terrorism designations of groups like Hamas or the PFLP have, at times, echoed legal arguments first developed in Iran-linked think tanks in Beirut and Qom.
Department XXX also serves as the liaison to the Iranian Cyber Army, a parallel influence apparatus that supports digital agitation. In the context of protests, the Cyber Army works with Department XXX to amplify narratives, spread disinformation about Israeli actions, and promote hashtags that have gone viral during flare-ups in Gaza or Jerusalem. While the IRGC’s cyber units handle more aggressive cyberattacks, Department XXX focuses on the digital shaping of foreign sentiment—particularly among Arab, Muslim, and left-leaning audiences in the West.
The success of Department XXX lies in its strategic subtlety. It does not build or control movements—it nudges them, guides them, and infuses them with ideological fuel that serves Tehran’s foreign policy. It uses the openness of Western civil society—its respect for dissent, multiculturalism, and free speech—as both a shield and a weapon. The absence of overt command makes denial easy and attribution difficult. This deniability has allowed Department XXX to operate freely in dozens of Western cities, even after repeated intelligence warnings.
The challenge for Western governments is formidable. Department XXX does not rely on espionage in the conventional sense—it relies on ideological asymmetry, a method that makes detection and disruption far more complex than tracking financial transfers or intercepting arms shipments. Countering its influence will require more than law enforcement; it will demand a recalibration of narrative intelligence, greater scrutiny of foreign-funded ideological infrastructure, and a public willingness to differentiate between authentic protest and engineered radicalization.
Iran understands that movements don’t need to be bought to be used. They only need to be redirected. And in that redirection, Department XXX has found one of the most powerful tools of foreign policy Tehran has ever deployed.
XXX engagements
