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 đź’Ž WEB3MAN.exe [@sergey_tutoov](/creator/twitter/sergey_tutoov) on x XXX followers
Created: 2025-07-09 17:22:55 UTC
{ WHITEHAT SAVED HYDRATION FROM $22M THEFT }
on june XX 2025 the @hydration_net protocol on @Polkadot faced a critical vulnerability in its aToken transfer logic - a subtle math bug could have let attackers mint unbacked liquidity shares in stablepools
the team paused $gdot liquidity, pushed an emergency stealth runtime upgrade within X hours, and negotiated a $500k bounty payout structured to avoid market crash
this post breaks down what went wrong, how it was fixed, and key lessons every polkadot developer should know
✧ what happened
1/ on june XX 2pm cest a whitehat reported via hydration’s immunefi bounty that aToken transfers used saturating math, so even if a user tried to send more aTokens than they held, the subtraction quietly returned zero and triggered an “withdraw all” call anyway
2/ this bug at the low-level currencies pallet silently disabled balance checks, and the stableswap add_liquidity_shares extrinsic then minted unlimited pool shares without real assets backing them
3/ within X hours hydration paused liquidity adds on the gdot stablepool, proposed a stealth emergency runtime upgrade on opengov, and deployed the fix about X hours after detection
4/ no one exploited it in production, but estimates show up to $22M could have been stolen from LPs if left unpatched
✧ why it mattered
→ polkadot’s shared security means bugs ripple across all parachains and users
→ aToken dust (tiny leftover balances) was already causing confusion and extra gas use on hydration’s evm integrations
→ a bug in generic transfer logic breaks every module that reuses it - here stableswap got weaponized
→ a $XX M hole in an l2-backed stablepool would’ve undermined confidence in the whole ecosystem
✧ how they fixed it
• paused only the affected gdot pool so other liquidity stayed live
• upgraded the runtime in stealth mode (code unpublished until enactment) to replace saturating_sub with checked subtraction + explicit underflow errors
• removed the temporary aToken “dust cleanup” workaround and will re-implement it properly in the currencies pallet after audit
• structured the $500k whitehat bounty: $250k in $hdx vested over XX months + $250k stablecoins, pending opengov ratification
✧ nine dev-ops lessons
1/ avoid saturating math by default
- use checked_add/check_sub and reserve saturating_* only with clear comments
2/ add property-based tests for edge cases
- cover underflow, dust and rounding scenarios in unit tests
3/ strengthen integration tests
- simulate mainnet levels of liquidity, aTokens and EVM calls
4/ enforce explicit balance asserts in high-impact code
- never trust other pallets blindly
5/ implement circuit breakers
- per-asset mint limits to auto-lock down on anomalies
6/ classify pull requests by scope
- label aave, evm, stableswap changes and trigger extra security review
7/ tighten EVM subsystem reviews
- require audits for any runtime code touching EVM transfers or aTokens
8/ fuzz testing on mainnet-like setups
- fuzz against real-world invariants (TVL thresholds, gas costs)
9/ more frequent continuous audits
- critical transfer logic must always be audited before merge
✧ why polkadot devs should care
this post mortem shows how a tiny math choice can blow up shared-security networks
as polkadot engineers we need rigorous tests, clear arithmetic, and fast opengov-approved patches
every pallet - from xcm to assets to evm - shares core transfer code
the next polkadot runtime upgrade might handle zk-proofs or async backing, but these security basics stay the same
more ::
when you audit or write low-level transfer logic in your parachain, how do you balance performance optimizations (e.g. saturating math) with safety checks? share your strategies below
đź’Ž follow fam - don't catch rect
@johnwastaken @TheFUDslayer @0xnecokizz
@Drucritt @0xghost06 @MookieNFT
@Tyler_Did_It @irvenxyz @RealAllinCrypto
@pantherQB19 @raAr3s @Savvyonchain
@legendarygainz_ @WorldOfMercek @xlee_istheking
XXX engagements
**Related Topics**
[500k](/topic/500k)
[bounty](/topic/bounty)
[$500k](/topic/$500k)
[$gdot](/topic/$gdot)
[stocks](/topic/stocks)
[mint](/topic/mint)
[protocol](/topic/protocol)
[hydrationnet](/topic/hydrationnet)
[Post Link](https://x.com/sergey_tutoov/status/1942997910049694138)
[GUEST ACCESS MODE: Data is scrambled or limited to provide examples. Make requests using your API key to unlock full data. Check https://lunarcrush.ai/auth for authentication information.]
đź’Ž WEB3MAN.exe @sergey_tutoov on x XXX followers
Created: 2025-07-09 17:22:55 UTC
{ WHITEHAT SAVED HYDRATION FROM $22M THEFT }
on june XX 2025 the @hydration_net protocol on @Polkadot faced a critical vulnerability in its aToken transfer logic - a subtle math bug could have let attackers mint unbacked liquidity shares in stablepools
the team paused $gdot liquidity, pushed an emergency stealth runtime upgrade within X hours, and negotiated a $500k bounty payout structured to avoid market crash
this post breaks down what went wrong, how it was fixed, and key lessons every polkadot developer should know
✧ what happened
1/ on june XX 2pm cest a whitehat reported via hydration’s immunefi bounty that aToken transfers used saturating math, so even if a user tried to send more aTokens than they held, the subtraction quietly returned zero and triggered an “withdraw all” call anyway
2/ this bug at the low-level currencies pallet silently disabled balance checks, and the stableswap add_liquidity_shares extrinsic then minted unlimited pool shares without real assets backing them
3/ within X hours hydration paused liquidity adds on the gdot stablepool, proposed a stealth emergency runtime upgrade on opengov, and deployed the fix about X hours after detection
4/ no one exploited it in production, but estimates show up to $22M could have been stolen from LPs if left unpatched
✧ why it mattered
→ polkadot’s shared security means bugs ripple across all parachains and users → aToken dust (tiny leftover balances) was already causing confusion and extra gas use on hydration’s evm integrations → a bug in generic transfer logic breaks every module that reuses it - here stableswap got weaponized → a $XX M hole in an l2-backed stablepool would’ve undermined confidence in the whole ecosystem
✧ how they fixed it • paused only the affected gdot pool so other liquidity stayed live • upgraded the runtime in stealth mode (code unpublished until enactment) to replace saturating_sub with checked subtraction + explicit underflow errors • removed the temporary aToken “dust cleanup” workaround and will re-implement it properly in the currencies pallet after audit • structured the $500k whitehat bounty: $250k in $hdx vested over XX months + $250k stablecoins, pending opengov ratification
✧ nine dev-ops lessons
1/ avoid saturating math by default
- use checked_add/check_sub and reserve saturating_* only with clear comments 2/ add property-based tests for edge cases
- cover underflow, dust and rounding scenarios in unit tests 3/ strengthen integration tests
- simulate mainnet levels of liquidity, aTokens and EVM calls 4/ enforce explicit balance asserts in high-impact code
- never trust other pallets blindly 5/ implement circuit breakers
- per-asset mint limits to auto-lock down on anomalies 6/ classify pull requests by scope
- label aave, evm, stableswap changes and trigger extra security review 7/ tighten EVM subsystem reviews
- require audits for any runtime code touching EVM transfers or aTokens 8/ fuzz testing on mainnet-like setups
- fuzz against real-world invariants (TVL thresholds, gas costs) 9/ more frequent continuous audits
- critical transfer logic must always be audited before merge
✧ why polkadot devs should care
this post mortem shows how a tiny math choice can blow up shared-security networks
as polkadot engineers we need rigorous tests, clear arithmetic, and fast opengov-approved patches
every pallet - from xcm to assets to evm - shares core transfer code
the next polkadot runtime upgrade might handle zk-proofs or async backing, but these security basics stay the same
more ::
when you audit or write low-level transfer logic in your parachain, how do you balance performance optimizations (e.g. saturating math) with safety checks? share your strategies below
đź’Ž follow fam - don't catch rect @johnwastaken @TheFUDslayer @0xnecokizz @Drucritt @0xghost06 @MookieNFT @Tyler_Did_It @irvenxyz @RealAllinCrypto @pantherQB19 @raAr3s @Savvyonchain @legendarygainz_ @WorldOfMercek @xlee_istheking
XXX engagements
Related Topics 500k bounty $500k $gdot stocks mint protocol hydrationnet